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1 Introduction
The way a minimum wage affects the overall distribution of earnings, including the earnings of
skilled high-wage workers, still remains a contested research question. Most evaluation studies
focus on whether the minimum wage improved the outcomes of low-wage workers (for an
overview, see Neumark and Wascher 2008). Fewer studies stress that minimum wage effects can
spill over to workers with earnings above the minimum wage (see for instance Gramlich et al.
1976, Grossman 1983, Lee 1999, Manning 2003, Teulings 2003, Neumark et al. 2004, Dickens
and Manning 2004 or, more recently, Autor et al. 2016, and Cengiz et al. 2019). According
to this research, wage floors create a spike in the wage distribution at the minimum wage and
boost wages of workers who earn somewhat more than the threshold. Depending on the bite,
the effects then ripple up to wages at about 20% above the minimum wage level (Neumark and
Wascher, 2008).
Conventional explanations for minimum wage spillovers put forward by the literature are that
(1) firms substitute unskilled with skilled labour as a reaction to the change in relative input prices
(Pettengill, 1981), (2) firms adjust their wage structure to maintain an internal wage hierarchy and
hence fairness perceptions, motivation, and effort among their highly paid employees (Grossman,
1983; Falk et al., 2006; Dube et al., 2018) and that (3) firms which previously paid relatively high
wages to attract workers must increase wages, too, in order to recruit enough new employees
(Manning, 2003). (4) More recently, Phelan (2019) argues that minimum wages raise wages
of low-wage jobs relative to undesirable but higher paid jobs, reducing the supply for the latter.
The decline in supply raises wages for the undesirable higher paid jobs, which then leads to
positive wage spillovers. All these mechanisms lead to increasing demand and increasing wages
for workers with earnings above the minimum wage.
While the existing literature focuses on positive wage spillovers for workers with wages just
above the minimum wage, some empirical studies indicate the existence of negative spillovers
for top-earners as well. For instance, Neumark et al. (2004) find negative wage responses of top
earners to the minimum wage in the US and briefly argue that such negative spillover effects on
top earners may arise through scale effects, but do not further test this hypothesis. Apel et al.
(2012) and Aretz et al. (2013) find indications of upper-tail wage compression in response to the
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Figure 1: Distribution of Real Hourly Wages Before and After the 1997 Minimum Wage
Introduction in the German Roofing Industry
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Notes: The figure shows kernel density estimates of real hourly wages based
on a full sample of all roofers using the LAK data (see Section 4.1). Hourly
wages are adjusted to prices in 1994.
first industry-specific minimum wages in the German main construction and roofing industry,
but also do not causally test and explain these findings. The observation becomes clear in case
of the German roofing industry, where the bite was particularly strong. As Figure 1 illustrates,
the minimum wage coincided with a compression of hourly wages not only at the bottom of the
distribution, as one would expect, but also at the top in East Germany. These descriptive findings
are striking, because wage compression at the top can have negative long-term consequences,
such as declining returns to skills and reduced incentives to invest in skills. To the best of
our knowledge, there does not yet exist a comprehensive framework that allows to study both
positive and negative minimum wage spillovers, nor a study which analyzes the implications for
employment, wages, returns to skills and skill supply.
The present paper aims at filling this gap by making at least three major contributions:
First, we estimate the minimum wage effects on the distribution of earnings by exploiting a
quasi-experiment in the German roofing industry. The German roofing industry comprises an
ideal setting to study minimum wage spillovers for two main reasons: (1) The minimum wage in
the German roofing industry was introduced in 1997 and was subsequently raised several times.
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The Kaitz Index, i.e. the ratio of the minimum wage level and the median wage, increased to
100% in East Germany over the observed post-reform period between 1997 and 2008. Given
that the average Kaitz-index in the OECD is around 50% (see Figure 6 in Appendix A.2), the
bite is exceptionally large by international standards, making unfavourable minimum wage
effects more likely; (2) For institutional reasons, the minimum wage was introduced only in
parts of the construction sector, one of which was the roofing industry. The wage distributions of
uncovered, yet comparable, sub-construction industries thus serve as a counterfactual for the
earnings of roofers in the absence of the policy reform. This setting is ideal to study the long-run
impact of minimum wages on the earnings distribution, as has been done for employment by
Aretz et al. (2013).1 To do this, we use particularly rich administrative data that allows us to
follow the approach by Firpo et al. (2009) and compare the unconditional wage distributions of
treated and untreated workers before and after treatment, holding constant compositional changes
resolving, for instance, from low productive workers leaving the workforce. For robustness, we
additionally consider a Changes-in-Changes estimator proposed by Athey and Imbens (2006). We
also contrast our unconditional quantile regression estimates to traditional conditional quantile
regression Koenker and Bassett (1978) to shed light on the role of between vs. within-group
inequality in driving the overall compression of wages that we discover. We thus contribute to
the empirical literature on the (long-run) minimum wage effects on earnings, wage inequality
and minimum wage spillovers, outlined above.
Second, we develop a labour market model with labour-labour substitution and a scale effect
that is able to explain how a minimum wage can induce both positive and negative spillovers to
workers with different skills. In our model, spillover effects are moderated by two adjustments to
the minimum wage: (1) Firms substitute low- by medium-skilled workers, but not by high-skilled
ones, as only medium-skilled workers’ tasks provide close substitutes to those of low-skilled.
This is in line with Distance Dependent Elasticity of Substitution (DIDES) models, where
minimum wage-induced substitution effects fade out at the top of the wage distribution (see
e.g. Teulings 2000). (2) The minimum wage-induced cost-shock to the industry leads to a
decline of employment in the industry, as higher costs and prices induce a reduction in demand
1While this quasi-experiment has been used by Aretz et al. (2013) to study the effect of the minimum wage on
the probability to remain employed, we are the first to analyze wage spillovers and their implications.
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and production. The net effect on high-skilled workers is thus negative, whereas the effect on
medium-skilled depends on the relative size of the scale and substitution effect. Both adjustments
are moderated by the bite of the minimum wage. Our model thus extends the empirical and
theoretical literature on minimum wage spillovers (see above) by allowing for negative minimum
wage spillovers and by showing under which conditions spillovers may be either positive or
negative. Moreover, it provides a potential explanation for the negative spillover effects found
for the US (Neumark et al., 2004) as well as for Germany (Apel et al., 2012; Aretz et al., 2013).
Third, we empirically test our models’ predictions for minimum wage spillovers, employment
and skill supply. In particular, we empirically quantify the scale and substitution effects within
a regional labour market approach, which is designed to capture aggregate effects, and assess
the resulting net effects on workers with different skills.2 We thereby contrast West and East
Germany, which were affected very differently, thus providing insights into the role of the
minimum wage bite in explaining our findings. This is particularly relevant, as the bite of
minimum wages is on the rise in many countries (see Figure 6 in Appendix A.2). By doing
so, we contribute to the literature on minimum wage spillovers as well as the literature on
heterogeneous effects of minimum wages (in our case wage groups and skills). Finally, we
estimate minimum wage effects on employment and skills of (new) apprentices to gain insights
into adjustments in skill supply. We thus also complement research on the effects of minimum
wages on (apprenticeship) training and skill supply, which so far reached mixed conclusions.3
Overall, we find significant positive real wage effects of up to 11% for lower-quantile workers
between 1997 and 2008 that ripple up to the 60th quantile in East Germany. However, the
minimum wage also caused a reduction in real wages by up to 5% in East Germany (stagnation
2A few other studies have estimated minimum-wage induced scale and substitution effects for labour-labour
substitution. Welch and Cunningham (1978) estimate aggregate employment responses of different age groups to
minimum wages and extract the scale- and substitution effects from the aggregate responses based on a conceptual
framework. They find that the negative scale effect dominates the positive substitution effect for young adults,
whereas teenagers suffer from both negative scale and substitution effects. Pereira (2003) provides similar findings
but does not extract the underlying scale- and substitution effects. Giuliano (2013) actually finds positive effects of
minimum wages on teenage employment and explains this by firms’ monopsony power. However, she does not
differentiate the scale and substitution effects. Fairris and Bujanda (2008) estimate labour-labour substitution for
different types of low-qualified workers, but they do not take into account scale effects.
3 While some authors find negative effects of minimum wages on training (Fairris and Pedace, 2004; Hashimoto,
1982; Schumann, 2017), others find no effects (Acemoglu and Pischke, 2003; Arulampalam et al., 2004; Grossberg
and Sicilian, 1999). A potential explanation for the mixed findings is that the effects depend on the type of training
(Neumark and Wascher, 2001) and on the type of worker (Lechthaler and Snower, 2008).
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of nominal wages) among firms’ highest paid employees, who mostly comprise high-skilled
workers. We show that the observed upper-tail wage-compression effect in East Germany is
solely driven by a reduction in between-group inequality, suggesting deteriorating returns to
observable skills in the East as a result of the policy reform. In West Germany, where the
minimum wage bite was lower, we find much weaker wage effects at the lower tail (4%) and no
compression at the top.
In line with our theoretical framework, we show that positive wage spillovers for medium-
skilled workers were driven by a positive substitution effect that overcompensated a negative
scale effect (i.e. positive net employment effect). In contrast, the negative wage spillovers on
high-skilled workers are the result of negative scale effect without any substitution towards
these workers (i.e. negative net employment effect). The latter negative wage spillovers on top
earners were, however, only found for East and not for West Germany, suggesting that a strong
bite promotes such unfavorable adjustments. In line with deteriorating returns to skills in East
Germany, we further find a negative minimum wage effect on skill supply measured by a less
favorable selection of trainees.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide a theoretical framework
that is able to explain both positive and negative minimum wage spillovers for workers with
different skills. In Section 3, we describe the German roofing industry as our main setting and
discuss potential control industries for a quasi-experiment. In Section 4, we introduce the data
and provide descriptive evidence on the minimum wage bite as well as trends in earnings. In
Section 5, we discuss our identification strategy to estimate both conditional and unconditional
quantile treatment effects of the minimum wage on the distribution of earnings together with
several robustness checks. In Section 6, we quantify the scale and substitution effect as well as
its net effects in order to test whether the mechanisms proposed by our theory can indeed explain
the observed distributional impacts of the minimum wage. In Section 7, we test our models’
predictions for skill supply. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
5
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we develop a simple, stylized labour market framework with labour-labour
substitution and a scale effect to explain how a minimum wage can lead to adjustments not only
among low-skilled workers, but also among medium and high-skilled workers located higher
up in the earnings distribution (minimum wage spillovers). The model also allows to derive
implications for adjustments in the returns to skills and skill supply. In the following, we briefly
summarize the main assumptions of the model and derive predictions regarding the adjustments
to the minimum wage (for details, see Appendix A.1).
2.1 Model and Main Assumptions
There are I firms in the industry, producing varieties qi of the industries’ final output Q under
monopolistic competition. Firms require a fixed high-skilled labour input hi = f as well as a
variable labour input ni = ϕqi where 1/ϕ is labour productivity. The variable labour input ni is
composed of low and medium-skilled workers, li and mi. Note that skills are defined as fixed
individual attributes which are rewarded on the labour market. We focus on three skill groups
for simplicity. Low, medium and high-skilled workers earn wages wL, wM and wH , respectively.
We use w̄ as the wage cost index for the variable labour input (which is composed of medium
and low-skilled workers). Firms can replace low by medium-skilled workers with constant
elasticity of substitution η , whereas high-skilled workers provide no close substitute for low- and
medium-skilled labour. This assumption is similar to DIDES models, where low-skilled tasks
are more easily substituted by medium compared to high-skilled tasks and it is in line with the
empirical literature on spillover effects, which finds substitution only towards workers who earn
slightly above the minimum wage. In our case, this is particularly true due to industry regulations
that require firms to be run by high-skilled workers (e.g. master craftsmen or vocationally trained
workers with sufficient work experience), thus widening the gap between low- and high-skilled
workers’ tasks.
Consumers have Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) preferences for the varieties i
produced by the firms with elasticity of substitution σ > 1 between the varieties. We further
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assume that demand for the overall output of the industry is price sensitive with the constant
price elasticity of demand ε < 1. The market is governed by monopolistic competition among
homogeneous firms and free entry.4
We solve the model as a flow equilibrium, where at each time instant t, a share δ of each
type of worker exogenously retires. The supply of low-skilled workers greatly exceeds demand.5
This implies that they earn their reservation wage w, unless there is a minimum wage wMW that
exceeds their reservation wage, wL = min(w,wMW ). For simplicity, we assume that the minimum
wage is binding only for low-skilled workers (w < wMW < wM,wH). At each time instant t a
mass of medium- EM and high-skilled entrants EH supply labour with wage elasticity of labour
supply θ . In the steady state, the inflow (entrants) of workers equals the outflow (retirement),
and expected wages correspond to actual wages. We abstract from any wage setting frictions;
wages adjust until labour supply equals labour demand, which implies no unemployment among
medium- and high-skilled workers.
With these assumptions, we can solve for medium- and high-skilled workers’ equilibrium
wages
wH =
(
δ
σEH
)1/θ
Q
ε̃/ε
θ
0 w̄
−ε̃/θ (1)
wM =
(
δ (σ −1)
σEM
)1/(θ+η)
Q
ε̃/ε
θ+η
0 w̄
η−ε̃
θ+η (2)
where Q0, EM and EH are constants and ε̃ = ε σ−1σ−ε is the overall price elasticity of industry-
level output. Jointly with low-skilled wages wL = wMW and the CES wage cost index w̄, these
equations describe the equilibrium in our industry.
2.2 Adjustments to the Minimum Wage
Proposition 1 (Scale Effect). The introduction or rise of a minimum wage
a) raises average wage costs ∂ ln w̄
∂ lnwMW
> 0, and
4We assume free entry to keep the analysis as simple as possible. Introducing Melitz (2003)-type entrance costs
and firm heterogeneity does not change the main results.
5This assumption is motivated by the high unemployment rate among low-skilled workers.
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b) reduces industry-level employment ∂ lnN
∂ lnwMW
< 0.
Proof. Using ∂ ln w̄
∂ lnwMW
= (1−α) ∂ lnwM
∂ lnwMW
+α (where α is the steady-state cost share of low-skilled
workers) and the equilibrium medium-skilled wage (2), we derive ∂ ln w̄
∂ lnwMW
= (1−α)(θ+η)
θ+(1−α)η+αε̃ . This
is strictly positive for 0 < α < 1, θ > 0, η > 0, ε̃ > 0, showing that a minimum wage raises
average wage costs.
Rising wage costs imply a decline in demand for the variable labour input, ∂ lnN
∂ lnwMW
=
−ε̃ ∂ ln w̄
∂ lnwMW
.
The intuition of the scale effect is as follows: The minimum wage for low-skilled workers
is a cost-shock, raising average wages (1.a). This implies that the industry shrinks due to the
negative slope of industry product demand, i.e. output and net employment decline (1.b). The
size of the negative scale effect depends on the price elasticity of industry level output ε̃ and
on the size of the minimum wage. The more sensitive consumers respond to price changes, the
larger the negative effect of a minimum wage-induced cost shock to the industry. For instance, if
consumers are more price sensitive, such as during recessions, the scale effect is larger. Moreover,
the stronger the minimum wage bite, the larger is the cost-shock to the industry and the larger
are the disemployment effects.
Proposition 2 (Substitution Effect). The introduction or rise of a minimum wage
a) reduces the wage of medium- relative to low-skilled workers ∂ lnwM/wL
∂ lnwMW
< 0, and
b) raises the share of medium-skilled workers ∂ lnM/N
∂ lnwMW
> 0.
Proof. The implications for medium-skilled workers’ relative wages are (using the result for
average wages as before) ∂ lnwM/wL
∂ lnwMW
= − ε̃+θ
θ+(1−α)η+αε̃ . This is strictly negative for 0 < α < 1,
θ > 0, η > 0, ε̃ > 0, showing that the minimum wage reduces the wages of medium- relative
to the low-skilled workers. The decline of medium-skilled workers’ relative wages implies an
increase in their employment share, ∂ lnM/N
∂ lnwMW
=−η ∂ lnwM/wL
∂ lnwMW
.
Intuitively, the minimum wage implies a rise in the relative costs for low- relative to medium-
skilled workers (2.a), which induces an increase in the share of relatively cheaper medium-skilled
workers (2.b). The effect is stronger the larger the elasticity of substitution between worker
8
types η and the stronger the minimum wage bite. The reason is that a higher elasticity of
substitution between worker types implies that it is easier for firms to replace the relatively more
expensive low- by medium-skilled workers. In contrast, the ratio of the high-skilled labour input
to the variable labour input (of medium- and low-skilled workers) remains constant – there is no
substitution towards high-skilled workers in our model, as their tasks are no close substitutes to
those of low-skilled workers.6 This is in line with the empirical literature which typically finds
positive wage spillovers only for workers who earn slightly above the minimum wage, but not
for top-earners (see introduction).
Proposition 3 (Net Effect). The introduction or rise of a minimum wage
a) raises (reduces) medium-skilled workers’ wages, and
b) raises (reduces) medium-skilled employment
if the elasticity of substitution between workers η exceeds (is lower than) the industry product
demand elasticity ε̃ .
Irrespective of the relative size of these two elasticities, the introduction or rise of a minimum
wage
c) reduces wages of high-skilled workers ∂ lnwH
∂ lnwMW
< 0, and
d) reduces employment of high-skilled workers ∂ lnH
∂ lnwMW
< 0.
Proof. We derive ∂ lnwM
∂ lnwMW
= η−ε̃
θ+η
(1−α)(θ+η)
θ+η−α(η−ε̃) . For 0<α < 1, θ > 0, η > 0, ε̃ > 0, this is positive
(negative) if η > ε̃ (η < ε̃). The employment effect is analogous due to ∂ lnM
∂ lnwMW
= θ ∂ lnwM
∂ lnwMW
.
We take the first derivative of high-skilled equilibrium wages (1) w.r.t. lnwMW , which yields
∂ lnwH
∂ lnwMW
= − ε̃
θ
(1−α)(θ+η)
θ+(1−α)η+αε̃ . This is strictly negative for 0 < α < 1, ε̃ > 0 and η > 0. High-
skilled labour supply strictly increases in wages, which implies that high-skilled employment
declines in the minimum wage.
The introduction or rise of a binding minimum wage for low-skilled workers thus might
raise or reduce wages (3.a) and employment (3.b) of medium-skilled workers, depending on
6This is due to the fixed high-skilled labour input assumption jointly with homogeneous firms and free entry.
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whether the substitution or scale effect dominates. The net effect is governed by the relative
size of the elasticity of substitution between worker types η and the price elasticity of industry
product demand ε̃ . The net effect on high-skilled workers’ wages (3.c) and employment (3.d) is
always negative – they suffer from the negative scale effect but do not gain from compensating
substitution effects.
Corollary 1 (Returns to Skills and Skill Supply). The introduction or rise of a minimum wage
a) raises the entrance of medium- relative to low-skilled workers,
b) reduces high-skilled workers’ wages relative to medium-skilled workers’ wages ∂ lnwH/wM
∂ lnwMW
<
0, and
c) reduces employment and entrance of high-skilled workers relative to medium-skilled
workers.
Proof. In the long run, the effect on the ratio of the entrance of medium- to low-skilled workers
is analogous to the effect on the employment ratio and thus directly follows from Proposition 2.
We use the results from Proposition 3 jointly with the results from Proposition 1 to derive
∂ lnwH/wM
∂ lnwMW
=−η
θ
(1−α)(ε̃+θ)
θ+(1−α)η+αε̃ < 0.
The results for the effects on the high-to-medium-skilled employment ratio are proportional
to the relative wage effects, ∂ lnH/M
∂ lnwMW
= θ ∂ lnwH/wM
∂ lnwMW
< 0. The effects on the corresponding entrants
ratio are analogous.
The effects on skill supply are analogous to the employment effects in the long run. As
firms employ a larger share of medium-skilled workers, in the long-run flow equilibrium, also
the entrance of medium- relative to low-skilled workers rises. Moreover, wages of high-skilled
workers decline relative to those of medium-skilled workers, as the former do not profit from
substitution effects unlike the latter – the returns to skills decline. This is associated with a
decline in the supply of high-skilled workers relative to medium-skilled workers. It is getting
harder for the industry to attract high-skilled workers.
Overall, our model provides two main contributions. First, we extend the labour-labour
substitution model to include a scale effect. By doing so, our model not only explains why only
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medium-skilled workers profit from positive substitutions effects, but not high-skilled (similar to
the continuous version of Teulings 2000, where spillovers fade out with workers earnings). It
also explains how the net spillovers can turn negative through a minimum wage-induced decline
in product demand and net overall employment in the industry. The latter scale effect is a missing
link that may be of particular importance when studying minimum wages with a large bite in
a context of an economic downturn with falling revenues. Second, our model is also able to
explain how a minimum wage can reduce returns to skills and, ultimately, hamper skill supply.
So far, we are not aware of any framework to study such adjustments.7
3 The German Roofing Industry
3.1 Minimum Wage Regulations
Until the introduction of the national minimum wage in 2015, the German minimum wage
regulations were organised on an industry level. The first industry-specific minimum wages were
introduced in 1997 in three industries of the construction sector, including the main construction
industry, the roofing industry and the electric trade industry. After 1997, further industries within
and beyond the construction sector decided to implement a minimum wage. The industry-specific
minimum wages typically differ between East and West Germany, reflecting the large wage
difference between the two parts of the country. According to the association of employers
(National Association of Roofers, ZVDH), there are two main reasons for the introduction of
a minimum wage: first, to protect the traditional craft in Germany against the increasing cost
pressure from cheap East European labour; and second to reduce the large wage differences,
especially between East and West Germany. Since tariff agreements are negotiated on an industry
level in Germany, not all industries in the construction sector agreed on implementing a minimum
7Several authors study the role of minimum wages for training, reporting mixed evidence (see above). There are
two opposing mechanisms (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999): On the one hand, minimum wages hinder workers to
temporarily compensate firms for the training costs via lower wages, reducing incentives to form skills. On the
other hand, minimum wages lead to wage compression, which induces substitution towards trained workers whose
wages decline relative to untrained workers. We complement this literature by showing that there is a scale- and
substitution-effect which differs between skill-groups, explaining why the minimum wage has heterogeneous effects
for differently skilled workers.
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wage in the mid 90s.8 The evaluation of the minimum wage at an industry-level provides the
opportunity to compare similar industries within a quasi-experiment. The roofing industry
comprises a particularly interesting case for two reasons: (1) The minimum wage was among
the first to be introduced in Germany, allowing us to study its effects over a long time period.
(2) Additionally, the minimum wage level was exceptionally large by international standards, as
discussed in Section 4.2.
The minimum wage in the roofing industry was introduced in October 1997. The responsible
trade union (Trade Union for Building-Agriculture-Environment, IG BAU) and the ZVDH agreed
as part of a general collective bargaining agreement on a minimum wage of 8.2 e in West and 7.7
e in East Germany. All blue-collar workers in the roofing industry, including minor employment,
are covered by the minimum wage regulation. Apprentices, cleaning staff and white-collar
workers are exempted from the regulations. Since 1997, the minimum wage has been raised
subsequently (see Table 4 in Appendix A.2). The strongest increase occurred in March 2003 for
East Germany, where the trade unions and employers agreed on a national minimum wage of 9
e. Periods with no minimum wage regulations are the result of tariff agreements that expired
before the new regulations came into force. The interruptions were short, and the continuation of
the minimum wage expected, so that firms did not adjust wages downward during this period.9
3.2 Selection of Control Industries
The roofing industry is a sub-sector of the construction sector and constitutes a traditional
craft that provides services including the installation of roofs on new buildings for public and
private clients, repairing of roofs including energy-efficient upgrading, and the installation of
solar collectors. Potential control industries for the treated roofing industry should (1) not be
8The introduction of industry-specific minimum wages depends on the industry-specific negotiations between
the respective trade unions and employment associations. In addition to differences in the negotiation processes
between industries, industries also differ in their spatial organization. Regulations are adopted on a national level
in some industries, including the roofing industry, the main construction industry, as well as in the electric trade
industry. In other industries, including the plumbing industry, the collective-bargaining competence needs to be
delegated from the regional to the national level first. This makes policy implementation more difficult for some
industries, explaining why minimum wage were not uniformly introduced.
9Inspections of hourly wages on a monthly basis (LAK data, see Section 4.1) for these periods by quantile of the
hourly wage distributions show no downward adjustments of hourly wages for either of the quantiles 0.1, 0.25, 0.5,
0,75 and 0.9, see Appendix A.6 for details.
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Table 1: Various Economic Indicators for Roofers and Selected Control Industries
Roofers Plumbers Glaziers Source, year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of firms 10,958 34,650 3,305 A, 1996
Number of employees 87,170 235,070 16,065 A, 1996
Avg. number of employees per company 7.9 6.7 4.8 A, 1996
Avg. gross daily wage/fulltime employee (in e) 66.2 68.6 66.3 A, 1996
Share of covered blue-collar workers: (in %) A, 1996
unskilled 29.3 11.1 19.3
skilled 66.7 83.4 73.9
master craftmens 3.7 5 6.1
part-time workers 0.2 0.2 0.4
Share of firms by revenues (in 1,000): B, 1996
< 100 DM 6.8 8.8 13.6
100-500 DM 24.6 33.7 42.8
500-1,000 DM 26.1 23.5 21.5
1,000-2,000 DM 25.1 19.3 13.5
> 2,000 DM 17.4 14.6 8.5
Number of companies/1 Mio. industry revenue 1.4 1.5 2.2 B, 1996
Value added in e per employee 37,195 35,949 32,931 C, 2001
Share of labour costs (in %) 36 32.5 49 C, 2001
Investments/employee (in e) 1,472 1,229 2,482 C, 2001
Notes and Sources: A - BA data, see Section 4.1, subsamples projected to 100%; B - German
sales-tax statistics of the German Federal Statistical Office (Umsatzsteuerstatistik); C - Cost Structure
Survey of the German Federal Statistical (Kostenstrukturerhebung).
subject to any minimum wage regulation, (2) depend on the same business cycle as the roofing
industry, (3) have a similar market structure and (4) should not be vulnerable to spillovers to
and from the roofing industry. Although focusing on earnings rather than employment, we
exploit the same quasi-experiment as Aretz et al. (2013), which builds on extensive analysis of
potential control industries (see more detailed tests in Aretz et al. (2011)). Building on their
work, we choose plumbers (and alternatively glaziers) as preferable control industries for our
Difference-in-Differences analyses for four reasons:10:
First, the control industries are, similar to the roofing industry, part of the same construction
sector and therefore share many basic characteristics of which some important ones are discussed
10The following industry coding identifies the industries: roofers (WZ93/WZ03: 45.22.1), plumbers (WZ93:
45.33.1 und 45.33.2./WZ03: 45.33.0), glaziers (WZ93/WZ03:45.44.2). Note that painters and vanishers, as well
as building construction including building bridges and tunnels, were generally also among the potential control
industries. However, as painters and vanishers introduced a minimum wage in 2003, they cannot provide a
counterfactual for the evaluation of long-run effects. Building construction turned out to show a very different
economic trend.
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below. In contrast to the roofing industry, the control industries however did not introduce a
minimum wage in the early 90s for mainly political reasons. This makes the industries generally
suitable to reflect the counterfactual situation in the roofing industry in case of no minimum
wage introduction.
Second, both control industries experienced very similar business cycle trends (see Figure
7 in Appendix A.4), namely a severe and long-lasting economic downturn in the aftermath of
the boom period in the early 90s. Decreasing investments in housing and industrial buildings
resulted in decreasing sales and revenues that led firms to increasingly lay off workers, especially
in East Germany. In fact, the number of employed blue-collar workers subject to social security
contributions decreased from 70,000 to 40,000 between 1994 and 2004 (see Figure 7 in Appendix
A.4). After 2004, the construction industries almost fully recovered in West Germany, while the
recovery in East Germany was rather marginal.
Third, the plumbing and glazier industry are very similar to the treated roofing industry in
terms of their market structure before the introduction of the minimum wage. Building on Aretz
et al. (2011), Table 1 contrasts some important indicators for the selected industries for the year
before the policy reform. Overall, the comparison shows a very similar market size of roofers
and plumbers in terms of firm counts and revenues. Most firms operating in these industries
are relatively small. Compared to other industries, our treated and control industries are highly
regulated as reflected by the master craftsman’s diploma that is required for offering services on
the market.11 Moreover, with a share of craftsmen and skilled workers of around 70%, roofing
firms operate with a relatively skilled staff. This share is also very high in our control industries.
The number of companies per 1 million industry revenues, as a measure of competition, is the
same in roofing and plumbing. Value added, investments per employee as well as labour cost
shares of roofing companies are more similar to those figures for plumbing firms as compared to
glaziers. The evidence suggests that the plumbing and glazier industries are comparable in terms
of market conditions.
11The Master craftsman (“Meister”) is the highest professional qualification in crafts. The requirements to become
a master craftsman are usually an education in the crafts in which the examination should be taken (a successfully
completed apprenticeship) and experience of at least 3 to 5 years as a journeyman (Geselle). Only then can training
courses for the Master’s examination (“Meisterprüfung”) be followed. The duration of the courses depends on the
craft and can take 4 to 6 years.
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Fourth, the potential for spillovers between these industries is low. Among others, these
industries are highly regulated and have very specific skill requirements so that workers cannot
simply switch jobs between them. This is particularly true for qualified workers. However, even
for unqualified workers, opportunities for roofers to find a better local employment in one of
the control industries were low during the investigated time period due to the severe economic
downturn in the entire construction sector. In fact, we find only few worker transitions between
these industries (see Section 5.1.1). Moreover, it is very unlikely that roofers took advantage of
the more stable West German economy due to the generally low degree of residential mobility of
roofers.
4 Data and Descriptives
4.1 Administrative Linked Employer-Employee Data
We use Linked Employer-Employee Data from the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) as
our main data source. This data matches firm data from the IAB Establishment History Panel
(BHP) with personal data from Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB). Both are generated
via labour administration and social security data processing. The data contains all workers
subject to social security contributions by their employers. We have access to subsamples of
roofers (75%), plumbers (30%) and glaziers (75%).12 The data include individual employment
histories for these workers on a daily basis, including several worker characteristics such as
age, sex, occupational status, gross daily wages and education of workers. The firm-level data
consists of information on the workforce structure, including the number of workers in certain
educational groups. For the analysis, we use annual cross sections at the cut-off date June 30th.
We focus on male workers above 19 years of age and drop minor employment, apprentices and
white-collar workers that are not covered by the minimum wage regulations. In total, we are
left with 788,611 yearly observations for 171,190 roofers as well as 1,059,475 observations
for 233,024 workers from uncovered control industries (plumbers, glaziers) for the time period
12We drop painters, which are generally also available in our data set, but which also introduced a minimum wage
in 2003 so that control group comparisons for long-term analyses are ruled out.
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1994-2008.
The advantage of the BA data is that they allow us to conduct comparisons of daily wage
developments between treated and untreated industries. Since they do not include information on
hours worked, we further exploit a full sample of all roofers provided by the Central Pay Office
(Lohnausgleichskasse, LAK) of the roofing industry. The LAK data collects, among others,
monthly information from firms on the number of actual working hours for each worker as well
as their gross wages from the year 1995 onwards. Since the reporting is mandatory for firms,
and may impose a penalty for non-compliance, the information is highly likely to comprise all
blue-collar roofers. In total, we are able to exploit 1,055,137 June observations for 206,753
roofers across the period 1995-2010. The reason why we do not choose the LAK data as the
main data source is that it is only available for roofers, which precludes comparisons between
treated and untreated industries. However, we use the LAK data for descriptive analyses on the
developments of the minimum wage bite, hourly wages and hours worked in the roofing industry.
Details of this data set are reported in Appendix A.3.
4.2 Bite and Trends in Earnings
In the following section, we provide descriptive facts on the bite and trends in earnings. The
bite of the minimum wage was high with a Kaitz-Index of 63% in West Germany in the year
of its introduction (see Appendix A.2 for details). That is, the minimum wage reached 63% of
the median wage in the industry in 1997. It rose to 73% in 2006, where it remained until 2009.
The figures for East Germany are even higher, where the Kaitz-Index was 82% in 1997 and rose
to 100% in 2006, remaining at that level until 2009. These figures are large by international
standards, as the average bite among OECD countries is around 50% (see Figure 6 in Appendix
A.2).
We expect the minimum wage to explain the significant changes in the earnings distribution.
The strong compression at the bottom and top of the earnings distribution in Figure 1 are thereby
not driven by adjustments in hours worked. To demonstrate this, we inspect trends in monthly
wages and hours worked for selected quantiles of the hourly wage distribution (see Table 8 in
Appendix A.6). Whereas wages (both hourly and monthly) show a compression comparable to
16
Figure 1, monthly hours worked rather follow comparable patterns across the wage quantiles.
The wage compression at the top reflects wage restraints among skilled workers. We show
this in Table 5 in Appendix A.5, which displays average yearly wage changes and other worker
characteristics for selected wage quantiles. Real wages decline at the top, while nominal wages
stagnate. In line with our expectations, top earners have higher formal skills, more tenure, are
older and work in larger firms in both parts of Germany.
Wage compression and stagnating top-earners’ wages are not only driven by new roofers
entering the labour market with lower entry wages, but rather reflect pay restraints among skilled
workers that have been working in the roofing industry and for the same firm ever since.13 The
latter speaks for a decline in the returns to observable skills.
5 Minimum Wage Effects on Earnings and Returns to Skills
5.1 Estimation Approach
In this section, we estimate the causal impact of the minimum wage at each quantile of the
earnings distribution. By studying the effects along the earnings distribution, we are able to
analyze minimum wage spillovers also for high-skilled workers. For identification, we exploit a
quasi-experiment: For institutional reasons, the minimum wage was introduced only in parts of
the construction sector, including the roofing industry. We compare the wage distributions of
roofers (treatment industry) with the counterfactual distributions of plumbers (control industry)
before and after the minimum wage introduction.14 Note that our results are robust when using
glaziers as an alternative control industry (see Section 5.3). For the estimation, we apply an
unconditional quantile regression technique developed by Firpo et al. (2009) to shed light on
the quantile treatment effects on the overall earnings distribution. We contrast these results
to a conditional quantile regression approach first proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1978).
The differences between both approaches reveal additional insights into the quantile treatment
13In order to check whether results are driven by new entrants, we restricted the data to all roofers that we observe
across the entire 16-year time period (thus comprising a balanced panel) and who worked for the same firm. The
results are very similar to the results from the full sample.
14For a graphical illustration of the Differences-in-Differences (DiD) approach applied to quantiles see Havnes
and Mogstad (2015).
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effects on the returns to observable skills. Below, we explain both approaches together with our
identifying assumptions.
5.1.1 Conditional Quantile Regression
With the conditional quantile regression, we estimate the effect of the minimum wage on the
conditional distribution of wages, holding other factors such as compositional changes constant.
In particular, we estimate the conditional log daily wage of workers at the τth quantile as
follows15:
Q(wit |Xit)τ = ατ +β τDi + γτPostt +δ τ(Postt×Di)+ητXit + ετit (3)
where Di refers to the treatment variable that takes the value one for treated roofers and zero
for untreated plumbers. Postt takes the value one for the post-reform period (t1: years 1998-
2008) and zero for the pre-reform period (t0: years 1994-1997).16 Xit is a set of individual and
firm level covariates, including age, tenure in industry, educational attainment (6 categories),
occupational status (3 categories), a part-time dummy, firm’s qualification structure (3 categories)
and firm size (4 categories).17 The coefficient δ τ gives us the Quantile Treatment Effect (QTE)
of the minimum wage introduction (and subsequent increases) at the τ th quantile of the earnings
distribution.
15Since we use daily wages from our cross-industry BA data as a dependent variable (compare Section 4.1), we
can not rule out that our estimates are driven by adjustments in hours worked rather than hourly wages. Previous
research has reached mixed conclusions about the minimum wage effect on hours worked (Couch and Wittenburg,
2001; Neumark et al., 2004; Zavodny, 2000). Nevertheless, descriptive inspections of roofers’ hourly wages,
monthly hours worked and monthly wages based on the roofing-specific LAK data suggest that adjustments in
wages work mainly through hourly wages (compare Section A.2).
16We also test a specification controlling for additional year-specific effects, which yields very similar results.
17Educational attainment: 1 low-level qualification without vocational training (reference), 2 low-level qualifica-
tion with vocational training, 3 Abitur without vocational training, 4 Abitur with vocational training, 5 University of
Applied Sciences degree, 6 University degree; occupational status: 1 unskilled worker (reference), 2 skilled worker,
3 master craftsmen or foremen (whether manual or clerical); firm’s qualification structure: 1 share of workers
without vocational training (reference), 2 with vocational training, 3 with university or college degree; firm size:
less than 6 workers (reference), between 6 and 10; between 11 and 20; more than 20.
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5.1.2 Unconditional Quantile Regression
Conditional quantile regression estimates capture the impact on the wage distribution within
worker groups with similar observable characteristics (within-group inequality). For instance,
a positive compression effect at the top (bottom) of the conditional wage distribution implies
that within each group of low-, medium- or high-skilled workers, those workers at the top
(bottom) have been squeezing together in terms of wages. One cannot make any statements on
changes in overall wage inequality with this method, as it neglects how the policy reform affects
between-group inequality. In the above case, overall wage inequality at the top (bottom) can even
increase, despite lower within-group inequality if, for instance, the wage returns to education
increases strong enough.
Technically speaking, conditional quantiles do not average up to their population counterpart,
as in mean regression analysis, since the Law of Iterated Expectations cannot be applied to
quantiles. We therefore implement the method proposed by Firpo et al. (2009) to estimate the
effect of the minimum wage on the unconditional (marginal) distribution of wages, holding
other factors constant. The method consists of two steps. In a first step, we define the Influence
Function IF(y;qτ) of our outcome variable y at sample quantile qτ , which is then transformed
(recentered) such that it aggregates back to the overall distribution of y. The so called Recentered
Influence Function (RIF) can be expressed as the weighted probability that the outcome variable
y lies above a certain quantile:
RIF(y;qτ) = qτ + IF(y;qτ)
= qτ +
τ−1{y≤ qτ}
fy(qτ)
(4)
where fy(qτ) is the density at that point. Equation 4 essentially transforms conditional to
unconditional quantiles before running the regressions. In a second step, we regress the RIF
on the explanatory variables, similar to Equation 3, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)18. By
doing so, we compare the unconditional wage distributions of treated and untreated workers both
18Firpo et al. (2009) compare their results to other specifications including a Logit and a nonparametric specifica-
tion. Since the results do not differ much between the RIF-OLS and the alternative specifications, we stick to the
first.
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before and after the policy reform. We thus receive Unconditional Quantile Treatment Effects
(UQTE), which we contrast to our Conditional Quantile Treatment Effects (CQTE).
5.1.3 Identifying Assumptions and Robustness
Three main assumptions are needed for identification. First, the differences in wages between
roofers and plumbers would have stayed the same in the absence of the policy reform (common
trends assumption). Our evidence in Section 3.2 shows that the plumbing industry has a
comparable market structure, experienced similar trends in several important economic indicators
and is in general very comparable. This supports our assumption that the roofing industry would
have experienced a similar wage development, had the minimum wage regulations not been
implemented in the roofing industry, conditional on covariates. Our industries are comparable
unconditionally, but we include a large set of covariates to control for remaining differences. We
further conduct robustness checks by re-estimating the model using glaziers as an alternative
control industry. Moreover, we apply the changes-in-changes method proposed by Athey and
Imbens (2006), a nonlinear method which identifies the quantile treatment effects under the
assumption that changes in wages between roofers and plumbers would have stayed the same
in the absence of the policy reform (common changes). The method essentially relaxes the
assumption that the results are invariant to a monotonic transformation of the outcome variable
such as taking log wages, i.e. the effects of time and group on the outcome are additively
separable. Finally, the introduction of the free mobility of labour in the European Union affects
could have affected the treated industry. However, our control industries are subject to the same
policy, such that we can identify the effect of the minimum wage by comparing the two industries.
Furthermore, free mobility of labour became effective only in 2004. We therefore restrict the
time period to years before 2004 as another robustness check. Our key results are robust to all
these extensions (see Section 5.3).
Our second assumption is that there are no indirect effects of the minimum wage regulations
in the roofing industry on the plumbing industry (Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption,
SUTVA). In order to check this, we calculate transition rates of roofers into the plumbing industry.
Since we find that only 0.35% of our observations in our entire data set shows a change in the
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industry coding between 1994 and 2008, there is hardly any labour mobility between roofers
and our control industries (plumbers and glaziers). Moreover, as the entire construction sector
experienced an economic downturn during the observation period, it is unlikely that demand
effects in the plumbing industry indirectly affected the roofing industry.
Our third assumptions is the absence of anticipation behaviour. To test this assumptions, we
conduct several placebo tests and re-estimate the model dropping the critical years (see Section
5.3). These robustness checks confirm our overall findings, as well.
In addition, there are two alternative explanations that must be ruled out. The first one
is sample selection. In particular, it might be the case that observed wage changes over time
between treatment and control industry reflect compositional changes, rather than changes due
to the minimum wage. For instance, if low productivity workers drop out of the workforce or if
smaller firms stop operating, this might bias the estimates. Our rich set of time-varying individual
and firm-level covariates controls for such selection effects based on observable characteristics,
although we cannot fully rule out compositional changes with respect to unobservable character-
istics.19 To further test whether our findings are driven by workers dropping out of the sample,
we re-estimate our model based on a balanced sample of roofers (for corresponding tests see
Section 5.3). The other alternative explanation is that wage changes might be driven by interfirm
mobility such as fired workers that re-enter employment in lower paid jobs. Corresponding
estimates based on a balanced sample of roofers, who stay employed in the same firm during
the entire time period, suggest that our observed wage changes are driven by firm-specific wage
policies among experienced workers rather than changing salaries for new hires.
5.2 Results
Figure 2 displays both UQTE and CQTE for 19 different quantiles (from 5th to 95th). Table 2
shows corresponding figures for quantiles τ=0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 (Columns 2-6) as well as for
two inequality measures (the variance of the wage and the Gini coefficient, Columns 7-8). The
results for the UQTE reveal a large degree of heterogeneity in the minimum wage effects across
19To our knowledge, there does not exist yet an unconditional quantile regression model for panel data with fixed
effects which is suitable for our purposes.
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Figure 2: Minimum Wage Effects on the Unconditional and Conditional Daily Wage Distribution
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Notes: This figure shows CQTE and UQTE estimates including their 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrap-
ping with 100 replications; Corresponding figures for selected quantiles are shown in Table 2.
quantiles as indicated by the deviations of the RIF-OLS coefficients from the OLS coefficients.
In particular, real wages at the lowest quantiles increased by more than 11% in East Germany as
a result of the minimum wage (Column 3, Basic Model). Figure 2 shows that the positive wage
effects extend to above the median worker. These effects coincide with a location shift of the
entire distribution (positive effect on the median, see Column 5). However, in contrast to these
favorable effects, workers with high wages in East Germany experienced real wage losses of up
to 5% (Figure 2). These real wage losses mostly reflect wage restraints among skilled workers
already working in the industry and within the same firm ever since (for corresponding tests see
Table 5 in Appendix A.5 as well as Section 5.3). Whereas the wage compression at the bottom
and middle of the distribution is in line with existing minimum wage theories on minimum wage
spillovers, the compression at the top remains unexplained. In Section 6, we show that these
results can be explained by the negative scale effect dominating the positive substitution effect
for high-skilled workers.
In contrast, the effects for West Germany are small. Workers at the lowest quantiles experi-
enced minimum wage-induced real wage increases of up to 4%. The effects fade out at about the
40th quantile (Figure 2). For higher earning groups, the wage effects increase slightly (above
1%). Despite the reduction in lower tail inequality, overall wage dispersion did not change much
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in this part of the country, also reflected in the small negative effect on the Gini coefficient. The
fact that we find much weaker positive wage effects at the bottom of the wage distribution and
no wage losses among upper tail workers reflects the lower bite of the minimum wage in this
part of the country (see Section A.2).
Comparing UQTE (solid line) to CQTE (dashed line) in Figure 2 for East Germany reveals
further insights into the wage compression effects in East Germany. Generally, conditional
estimates refer to within-group inequality, whereas unconditional estimates refer to overall
inequality. The difference between both estimates is informative about between-group inequality.
In our case, unconditional estimates (solid line) are much higher than conditional estimates
(dashed line) for workers below the median and unconditional estimates are much lower than
conditional estimates for workers with earnings above the median in East Germany. These
differences can be attributed to the between-group effect. At lower quantiles, the between- and
within group effect are both positive. This suggests that the minimum wage decreased wage
inequality at the lower rank both within groups with similar observable characteristics as well
as between these groups. More interesting is the pattern for upper quantiles. Here, within-
group inequality remained unchanged (zero treatment effect), while between-group inequality
decreased (negative treatment effect). The result, that the wage compression effect at the upper
tail in East Germany is driven solely by the between-group effect, indicates that returns to
observable skills decreased in reaction to the policy reform there. The result is in line with our
theoretical predictions according to which a strong minimum wage bite lowers the returns to
skills and, hence, depresses skill supply in a context where the negative scale effect dominates
the positive substitution effect for skilled workers (see Sections 6 and 7).
5.3 Robustness
Anticipation effects. To test whether our UQTE in Figure 2 are contaminated by anticipation
behaviour before the policy change, we conduct several placebo tests (Table 2). We restrict the
sample to the pre-reform years (1) 1994-1997, (2) 1994-1996 and (3) 1994-1995 and assume
the subsequent year to be the post-reform period. If there were no anticipation effects, we
would observe QTE of zero at each quantile. The results suggest positive anticipation effects in
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1997 (see Placebo I in Table 2) and to a lesser degree in 1996 (Placebo II), meaning that firms
started to adjust wages upwards prior to the minimum wage during these years. This implies
a downward bias for our main estimates. We do not find such effects for the year 1995 in the
East, and only weak effects in the West (Placebo III). To make sure the results are not driven
by these anticipation effects, we re-estimate the basic model in two versions: In a first version,
we declare the 1997 to be part of the post-reform period (Robustness I) since there are only 3
months between the data point in June 30th 1997 and the minimum wage introduction in October
1st of the same year. In a second version, we drop all observations of the years 1996 and 1997
(Robustness II). The slightly higher coefficients of the latter models suggest that the basic model
underestimates the wage effects. Nevertheless, the negative wage effects for top-earners in East
Germany remain significant. Overall, the estimates change only slightly, suggesting that our
estimates are robust.
Restricting the sample to stayers. The minimum wage caused a compression at the top of
the East German real wage distribution. This compression effect might either result from lower
entry wages of new workers or from wage restraints among incumbent workers. To test this, we
restrict the sample to workers who we observe in every year in the sample, creating a balanced
sample (Robustness III). The effects decrease in West Germany, indicating that wage changes in
Western Germany are partly driven by new entrants to the industry. In contrast, the effects stay
almost unchanged for East German roofers, which implies that our estimates for East Germany
are not driven by lower entry wages of new workers. Instead, real wages of incumbent top
earners declined in East Germany. We further restrict the balanced sample to all workers that
were employed in the same firm during the entire observation period (Robustness IV). Again
the results are stable for East German workers, suggesting that the effects are also not driven by
workers that lost their job and returned to work with a lower salary in a different firm.
Alternative control industries. Finally, we re-estimate the basic model using glaziers instead
of plumbers as a control industry (Robustness V). The results largley confirm our findings, which
is not surprising given the high comparability of glaziers and plumbers to roofers, as suggested
in Section 3.2.
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Table 2: Placebo Tests and Robustness Checks for UQTE in Figure 2
Dependent variable: log real daily wages
OLS Quantile Regression Estimates (RIF-OLS)
Post-reform period N τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9 Variance Gini
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
West Germany
Basic model
1998-2008 1,055,400 1.33*** 3.58*** 1.89*** 0.30*** 1.13*** 1.64*** 0.14 -0.05**
(14.66) (18.90) (18.79) (3.91) (13.31) (8.57) (1.14) (-2.84)
Placebo tests
I. 1996-1997 323,405 0.81*** 1.84*** 1.50*** 1.00*** 0.33* 0.66* 0.51* -0.03
(5.47) (7.15) (7.90) (8.04) (2.17) (2.28) (2.41) (-1.08)
II. 1995-1996 245,291 -0.07 0.78* 0.10 -0.01 -0.65*** -0.73* -0.34 -0.08**
(-0.39) (2.54) (0.43) (-0.06) (-3.46) (-2.05) (-1.21) (-2.66)
III. 1995 166,420 -0.54** -0.14 -0.79** -0.67*** -0.96*** -0.93* -0.60 -0.06
(-2.68) (-0.38) (-2.74) (-3.45) (-5.38) (-2.56) (-1.77) (-1.67)
Robustness of basic model
I. without year 1996 1,055,400 1.57*** 3.84*** 2.24*** 0.63*** 1.27*** 2.10*** 0.32* -0.04*
(15.99) (19.94) (19.98) (7.57) (12.93) (11.56) (2.40) (-2.03)
II. without years 1996 898,415 1.81*** 4.52*** 2.80*** 0.82*** 1.37*** 2.19*** 0.40* -0.06**
and 1997 (15.71) (20.25) (21.17) (8.24) (11.71) (8.68) (2.36) (-3.01)
III. only stayers 196,217 0.22 0.22 -0.04 0.85*** 0.17 -0.52 -0.29* -0.06**
(1.50) (0.91) (-0.23) (6.96) (0.94) (-1.42) (-2.21) (-2.70)
IV. only stayers 158,894 0.09 0.13 -0.14 0.70*** -0.09 -0.88 -0.32* -0.06*
in same firm (0.51) (0.44) (-0.71) (4.53) (-0.42) (-1.93) (-2.34) (-2.51)
V. Glaziers 559,508 2.15*** 5.02*** 3.85*** 1.36*** 1.08*** 0.96*** -0.24 -0.17***
(13.31) (16.42) (21.14) (9.24) (8.52) (3.58) (-1.32) (-6.41)
East Germany
Basic model
1998-2008 451,241 3.07*** 11.39*** 8.73*** 1.85*** -3.94*** -3.13*** -1.17*** -0.70***
(22.18) (61.03) (61.44) (15.04) (-19.31) (-11.84) (-5.53) (-31.25)
Placebo tests
I. 1996-1997 174,675 1.74*** 3.81*** 3.12*** 2.18*** -0.59 -0.65 -0.41 -0.19***
(7.72) (11.91) (14.85) (9.60) (-1.93) (-1.63) (-1.14) (-5.32)
II. 1995-1996 131,337 -0.17 0.83** 0.62* 0.61* -1.50*** -0.65 0.11 -0.02
(-0.60) (2.62) (2.01) (2.20) (-4.17) (-1.63) (0.28) (-0.43)
III. 1995 86,752 -0.91** -0.61 -0.39 -0.24 -1.77*** -1.16 0.35 0.05
(-2.75) (-1.20) (-1.12) (-0.79) (-3.76) (-1.96) (0.69) (0.83)
Robustness of basic model
I. without year 1996 451,241 3.47*** 11.36*** 8.73*** 2.54*** -3.15*** -3.12*** -1.09*** -0.67***
(22.72) (48.42) (64.97) (18.40) (-13.60) (-8.46) (-4.96) (-25.68)
II. without years 1996 363,318 3.86*** 12.72*** 9.81*** 3.17*** -3.51*** -4.65*** -1.26*** -0.77***
and 1997 (20.90) (49.64) (64.06) (21.54) (-14.90) (-10.29) (-5.62) (-25.91)
III. only stayers 41,518 2.64*** 11.63*** 7.26*** -0.33 -6.52*** -2.99** -1.25*** -0.60***
(6.24) (25.32) (22.77) (-0.65) (-9.07) (-2.82) (-3.33) (-9.83)
IV. only stayers 31,115 2.67*** 10.90*** 8.13*** 0.23 -7.82*** -1.41 -1.78** -0.64***
in same firm (5.07) (21.70) (21.13) (0.48) (-8.85) (-1.01) (-2.95) (-8.55)
V. Glaziers 251,694 -0.80** 8.91*** 3.53*** -2.83*** -6.18*** -4.68*** -1.06** -0.63***
(-2.64) (15.69) (13.58) (-13.97) (-18.54) (-8.22) (-2.86) (-14.63)
Notes: robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%, *** 0.1%. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 100
replications.
Alternative estimation procedures. As a final check, we estimate the QTE based on the
changes-in-changes model proposed by Athey and Imbens (2006). The alternative estimation
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Figure 3: Quantile Treatment Effects based on Changes-in-Changes (CiC) Model
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procedure tackles two problems: First, the effect of time might be heterogenous. For instance,
despite our evidence on the general commonalities, one might worry that treatment and control
industries experienced different time trends in the aftermath of the minimum wage introduction,
thus violating the common trends assumption. Second, the common trend assumption may not be
invariant to a monotonic transformation. In our case, the results may be different depending on
whether we use wages in level of logs. The CiC model solves these shortcomings by assuming
that our treatment and control industry experienced common changes (rather than common
trends). The results in Figure 3 confirm the findings of the UQTE based on the estimator by Firpo
et al. (2009), although the negative wage effect at the top of the wage distribution is somewhat
smaller (up to 2%).
6 What Explains the Wage Compression at the Top?
The positive wage effects at the bottom of the wage distribution, as well as the positive wage
spillovers for workers with earnings just above the minimum wage, can be explained by existing
minimum wage theories outlined in the introduction. However, existing theories leave the
negative minimum wage effects at the top of the distribution unexplained. Section 2 introduces a
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labour market model with labour-labour substitution and a scale effect to explain how spillover
effects can turn negative at the top of the distribution. In particular, our theory predicts that a
minimum wage induced increase in labour costs for low-skilled workers induces a cost-shock
that causes the industry to shrink – with negative effects on all workers (Proposition 1). The
increase of low-skilled workers’ wages induces firms to substitute low- for medium-skilled
workers due to the change in relative input prices (Proposition 2). High-skilled workers do not
benefit from substitution effects, as their tasks are not suitable substitutes to low-skilled workers’
tasks, in line with the existing literature which finds spillover effects to fade out quickly with
rising earnings. On net, employment of high-skilled workers decreases, whereas the employment
effect on medium-skilled workers is ambiguous, depending on the relative size of the scale and
substitution effect (Proposition 3).
To test these predictions, we decompose the minimum wage effect on low-skilled employment
(L) (net effect) into the effect on the low-skilled employment share (substitution effect) and the
effect on total employment (scale effect) as follows:
∂ lnL
∂ lnwMW︸ ︷︷ ︸
net effect
=
∂ lnL/(L+M+H)
∂ lnwMW︸ ︷︷ ︸
substitution effect
+
∂ ln(L+M+H)
∂ lnwMW︸ ︷︷ ︸
scale effect
(5)
We proceed analogously for medium- (M) and high- (H) skilled workers. We estimate the
respective effects within a regional DiD approach since we are interested in aggregate rather
than individual-level outcomes here. First, we create a continuous skill measure to classify
workers. Similar to other studies (e.g. Combes et al. 2008), we define skills as all fixed
individual attributes which are rewarded on the labour market. To estimate these, we use the
individual-level IAB micro data and conduct an individual-level regression of the log daily wages
on a set of dummies for year, industry, east, industry-year and east-year interactions as well
as individual-level fixed effects. From this regression, we extract the time-constant individual
fixed effect for each individual, which we define as an individuals’ skill level. We then rank
individuals based on this skill distribution by East/West and treated/untreated industry and define
three equal-sized tertiles, representing low-, medium- and high-skilled workers. In a second step,
we compute figures on employment and average wages for the total workforce and each skill
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group.20 We compute these figures at the level of 412 regional labour markets (NUTS-3) for
each industry and year between 1994-2008. Note that this is only possible because our sample
covers a large fraction of the population (see Section 4.1).
Based on this region-industry panel, we estimate the minimum wage effect on our outcome
variable (Yrt) in region r, industry j, and year t as follows:
lnYjrt = α +βD j +δ (Postt×D j)+νr j + ε jrt (6)
where D j represents the treatment status (roofing vs. plumbing industry) and Postt captures the
post-treatment phase. The term νr j represents industry-region fixed effects. The parameter δ
captures the effect of the minimum wage. Identification comes from comparing local outcomes
between treated and control industry before and after the minimum wage. The main difference
to the approach in Section 5 is that we compare industries across regions and time instead of
individuals (by quantile), since we are interested in aggregate industry effects here. Otherwise,
the identification assumptions are the same (see Section 5.1.3).
We use skill-specific employment shares, overall employment and skill-specific net em-
ployment as outcome variables to estimate the substitution effect, scale effect and net effect
from Equation 6. To test whether the regional level approach resembles the quantile regression
estimates for wages in Section 5, we estimate Equation 6 using skill-specific average regional
wages as the dependent variable. To account for size differences between regions, regressions are
weighted by (skill-specific) regional employment in pre-treatment years (for estimates without
weights, see Apendix A.7).21
Figure 4 shows the minimum wage effects on wages based on the approach described above.
Corresponding figures are shown in Appendix Table 6. Overall, the results resemble the quantile
regression results in Section 5. In particular, they demonstrate that the minimum wage led to a
substantial wage-increase among low-skilled workers (around 6%) in East Germany, whereas
high-skilled workers experienced minimum wage-induced wage-reductions (around 1%). For
West Germany, we find only very small positive wage effects for low-skilled workers (around 1%)
20We also conducted regressions based on a sample of only full-time workers, which yields comparable results.
21Our dependent variable is in logs, which implies that our treatment effect represents effects on change rates or
growth rates. We weight by regions’ initial sizes to take into account size differences between regions.
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Figure 4: Minimum Wage Effects on Wages by Skill Group
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Notes: Corresponding estimates are shown in Table 6 in the appendix. All regressions are weighted by regional
(skill-specific) employment in pre-treatment years. Whiskers mark the 95 percent significance interval.
and no impact on high-skilled workers. The findings confirm our results in Section 5, although
our estimates are smaller. The smaller effects likely reflect the fact that, by focussing on three
broad skill groups, we average out some of the spikes seen in the quantile treatment plots.22
The results for the substitution and scale effect are shown in Figure 5. For East Germany, we
see a substantial substitution of low- (-35%) by medium-skilled workers (+27%), whereas the
share of high-skilled workers is unaffected by the minimum wage. The finding is in line with our
theoretical predictions (and other minimum wage studies, see introduction) according to which
medium-skilled workers provide close substitutes for low-skilled ones, whereas high-skilled
workers do not. The relatively large substitution effect among medium-skilled workers potentially
reflects the strong minimum wage bite in the East, which required substantial adjustments within
firms in order to cope with minimum wage induced cost increases. However, these positive
(and neutral) substitution effects are counteracted by the negative scale effect, which has so far
been largely neglected in other studies. In particular, we find a substantial decline in overall
employment (-7%) resulting from overall increased labour costs (and falling firm revenues, see
Appendix A.8), such that the net impact on high-skilled workers is negative (-12%). For medium-
22We refrain from differentiating workers in more skill groups, as the number of observations in our region-
industry-year cells would become too small.
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Figure 5: Scale and Substitution Effects by Skill Group
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Notes: Corresponding estimates are shown in Table 8 in the appendix. All regressions are weighted by regional
(skill-specific) employment in pre-treatment years. Whiskers mark the 95 percent significance interval.
skilled workers, the positive substitution effects suffices to overcompensate the negative scale
effect, resulting in a net positive employment effect for these workers (+26%). For low-skilled
workers, the scale effect even enforced the negative substitution effect (on net, -34%).
In West Germany, where the minimum wage bite was much lower, we see a much smaller
substitution away from low- (-16%) to medium-skilled workers (+6%). Surprisingly, we also
find substitution towards high-skilled workers, although the effect is smaller (+5%). The latter
might suggest that low-skilled workers’ tasks are partly substitutable with high-skilled workers’
tasks in the West, but not in the East. This could be due to smaller differences between low- and
high-skilled tasks in West Germany, rooted in differences in the training systems for historical
reasons.23 The decline in overall employment is similar to East Germany (-9%). On net, the
positive substitution effects can just about compensate for the negative scale effect, so that the
net effects are close to zero for both groups (-2%). The net effect on low-skilled workers was
-24%.
Overall the results demonstrate that negative employment and wage responses to a minimum
wage for high-skilled workers may occur in situations where two circumstances come together:
23We abstract from substitution towards high-skilled workers to keep the model traceable and because we are
mostly interested in East Germany where no such substitution occurs.
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First, the minimum wage is introduced in an environment where the response of output to prices
is particularly negative, namely, during an economic downturn with falling revenues. Note that
we provide further evidence in Appendix A.8 suggesting negative minimum wage effects on
regional revenues (average firm, industry total and average firm per worker) in East and West
Germany. The findings are based on separate micro data for all active firms in Germany and
confirm a negative aggregate demand shock in both parts of the country. Second, the minimum
wage bite must be particularly high, while high-skilled workers are not close substitutes to
low-skilled workers. This situation leads to a large increase in wages of low relative to medium-
skilled workers, thus inducing a strong substitution away from low-skilled to medium-skilled
workers, while there is no substitution towards high-skilled workers. This is what we see in East
Germany, where the minimum wage level was set relatively high compared to lower wage levels.
In contrast, the bite was less severe in West Germany, explaining why we find more muted results
there.
7 Implications for Skill Supply
Our results from previous sections show that the minimum wage policy led to a wage compression
at both ends of the wage distribution and reduced the returns to skills in East Germany. In West
Germany, the effects on the wage distribution were much more muted, suggesting only slight
declines in the returns to skills. We explain these findings with our model of minimum wage-
induced scale and substitution effects. In the present section, we turn to the minimum wage
effects on skill supply.
According to our theoretical model, we expect (A) an increase in the entrance of medium-
relative to low-skills (Corollary 1), as firms restructure towards medium-skilled workers due to
the changes in relative wages. Moreover, we expect (B) a decline in the supply of high- relative
to medium-skills, as high-skilled workers do not profit from substitution effects and suffer from
declining returns to skills (Corollary 1). Moreover, as before, we expect differences between
East and West Germany due to the difference in the bite of the minimum wage.
To test these predictions, we follow a similar regional DiD approach as described in Section
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Table 3: Minimum Wage Effects on Industry Skill Supply
West Germany East Germany
(A) (B) (A) (B)
Share of Skills of Share of Skills of
apprentices apprentices apprentices apprentices
among entrants among entrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × post 0.07*** -0.01 0.03*** -0.03***
(13.43) (-1.44) (3.32) (-2.62)
Post 0.00 0.02*** -0.01 0.06***
(0.97) (7.06) (-0.92) (8.06)
Constant 0.26*** 0.03*** 0.18*** 0.02***
(115.31) (19.56) (51.48) (4.83)
N 9630 8869 2598 2396
R-squared 0.037 0.007 0.006 0.035
F 172.2 29.3 7.4 40.4
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, ***
1%. All estimates include industry-region fixed effects and are weighted with
pre-treatment number of entrants (in case of A), number of apprentices (in case
of B).
6. Based on the regional data and in line with our theoretical predictions, we estimate the effect
of the minimum wage on the supply of skills to the industry by using as dependent variables:
(A) the share of new apprentices among all entrants and (B) the share of apprentices with the
highest school degree (i.e. high-school degree) as proxies for medium- and high-skilled entrants.
Entrants are defined in our data as workers that have no prior working experience in the industry.
Trainees can be identified separately in the data via an indicator on workers’ occupational status.
Note that we would ideally classify entrants into low-, medium-, and high-skilled workers by
identifying their skills from individual fixed effects, as before. This is unfortunately not possible,
because these workers did not yet work in the industry. Our estimates are weighted to account for
differences in the size of regions (see table notes). Appendix A.9 provides unweighted results.
Table 3 shows the results. In East Germany, we find an increase in the share of apprentices
among new workers in the industry, reflecting the rise in the relative demand for medium-skilled
workers, as expected (A, Column 3). However, the quantitative size of the effect (+3%) is smaller
compared to the increase in relative demand (+27%) found in Section 6. One reason for this
gap could be that our dependent variable provides only a proxy for medium-skills, leading to
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an underestimation of medium-skilled entrees’ increase. Another reason could be that firms
restructure towards medium-skilled workers not only via hiring relatively more medium-skilled
workers, but also via a higher separation rate among low-skilled workers. In fact, complementary
work confirms this explanation by showing that the minimum wage significantly increased the
separation rate of low-skilled workers in East Germany (Aretz et al., 2013). In line with our
predictions, we further find a decline in the share of apprentices with a high-school degree (-3%)
in response to the minimum wage (B, Column 4). This finding reflects the reduced real wages of
high-skilled workers and returns to skills, which reduced the incentives for high-skilled workers
to enter the industry. This might also explain why the industry faced increasing problems in
attracting high-skilled workers in the aftermath of the policy reform, as extensively documented
by Aretz et al. (2011).
In West Germany, we also find an increase in the share of apprentices among new employees,
as expected (A, Column 1). Here, the effect (+7%) more closely matches the rise in relative
demand for medium-skilled workers (+6%) found in Table 6. This suggests that West German
firms restructure more strongly through hiring rather than separation. Aretz et al. (2013) indeed
find that separation rates for low-skilled workers increased more modestly in West compared
to East Germany, where the bite was also lower. Table 3 further shows that the minimum
wage had no statistically significant effect on the selection of workers into the West German
roofing industry (B, Column 2). This can be explained by the lack of negative wage effects on
high-skilled workers in this part of the country. The bite of the minimum wage apparently was
too weak to reduce returns to skills and the supply of high-skilled workers.
8 Conclusion
We investigate the impact of a minimum wage on workers’ wages, returns to skills and skill
supply in light of a particular interesting case where the minimum wage really bites hard: the
German roofing industry. The minimum wage was introduced in 1997 and was subsequently
raised several times. According to the Kaitz Index, the bite of the minimum wage in East
Germany has to be considered exceptionally high by international standards. In addition, the
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minimum wage was introduced during a long-lasting period of an economic downturn with
falling revenues, which tends to require further adjustments among firms. This setting is of
particular interest against the background of internationally rising minimum wages (see Figure
6 in Appendix A.2), in combination with an economic downward trend currently observed
around the globe. Based on our quasi-experimental case study, we draw four conclusions for the
understanding of minimum wages:
First, a minimum wage may induce positive wage spillovers to workers with wages slightly
above the minimum wage. For the roofing industry, we find significant real daily wage increases
of up to 11% for lower-quantile workers that ripple up to the 60th quantile in East Germany
between 1997 and 2008, where the Kaitz-index reached values of 100 percent (i.e. minimum
wage equals the median wage). In West Germany, where the Kaitz-index “only” reached values
of 72 percent, the wage effects are weaker (about 4% at the lower tail). Hence, the policy seems
to have met its goal of improving the earnings of low-wage workers (at least for those, who did
not loose their job due to the minimum wage) and reducing overall wage inequality.
Second, a minimum wage can reduce the earnings of high-skilled workers. According to
our estimates, the minimum wage caused a reduction in real daily wages of about 5% in East
Germany for the highest quantiles (stagnating nominal wages) that mostly comprise skilled and
experienced workers. In turn, the returns to skills declined in the industry. We do not find such
negative effects on wages in West Germany, where the bite was considerably smaller, suggesting
that the bite needs to be sufficiently large to cause such negative wage spillovers.
Third, negative spillovers may arise if the scale effect dominates the substitution effect.
We demonstrate this for the German roofing industry, where the minimum wage caused an
overall decline in product and labour demand in the industry. For medium-skilled workers, these
negative scale effects were overcompensated by positive substitution effects (resulting in a net
positive impact on wages and employment). High-skilled workers, however, did not profit from
such substitution effects as their tasks are not suitable substitutes to low-skilled minimum wage
workers, leading to a negative net impact on wages and employment. The proposed mechanism
may be a missing link in explaining negative spillovers from minimum wage policies, especially
in an environment of an economic downturn with falling revenues.
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Fourth, a minimum wage may also hamper skill supply. Our results suggest that the minimum
wage has worsened the selection of workers into the East German roofing industry. The industry
is facing increasing problems in attracting high-skilled workers. We do not find a significant
worsening of worker selection in West Germany, where the bite was weaker and had more muted
effects on the wage structure. This demonstrates how a minimum wage can affect skill supply.
Finally, a high minimum wage bite seems to be important in explaining our findings. Through-
out our paper, we find large effects particularly in East Germany, where the bite was large. Effects
in West Germany, where the bite was lower, are by far more muted. This is in line with a large
literature which focuses on incremental increases of minimum wages and finds no or only modest
disemployment effects. Even the first-time introduction of the general German minimum wage –
which had a bite of around 57% and was introduced in a boom-phase – was associated with only
moderate disemployment effects (Caliendo et al., 2018). Accordingly, minimum wages appear to
have unfavourable side effects only if they are set too high, such as in our case of East Germany.
This is particularly relevant against the background of rising minimum wages in many countries
(see Figure 6 in Appendix A.2).
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A Appendix
A.1 Theory
In this appendix, we show the details of our theoretical framework.
A.1.1 Production
There are I firms in the industry, producing varieties qi of the industries’ final output Q under
monopolistic competition. Firms require a fixed high-skilled labour input hi = f and a variable
labour input ni = ϕqi. Modeling high-skilled workers as a fix input implies no substitution
with lower skilled workers. This is similar to DIDES models, where low-skilled tasks are more
easily substituted by medium than by high-skilled tasks. In our case, this is regulated by the
master craftsmen requirement, according to which only master craftsmen or vocationally trained
workers with sufficient work experience are allowed to lead a roofing firm. Nevertheless, it
occurs more broadly in industries where high and low-skilled workers perform substantially
different tasks, precluding substitution between them.
The variable labour input is composed of low and medium-skilled workers. Firms can replace
low by medium-skilled workers with constant elasticity of substitution η , ni =
(
l
η−1
η
i +m
η−1
η
i
) η
η−1
.
Firms’ wage costs for low and medium-skilled workers are w̄ni = wLli +wMmi, where w̄ is the
wage resp. factor cost index. Firms optimally choose the composition of low and medium-skilled
workers, which implies
mi =ni
(wM
w̄
)−η
(7)
w̄ =
(
w1−ηM +w
1−η
L
) 1
1−η (8)
A.1.2 Consumption
Consumers have Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) preferences for the varieties i produced
by the firms with elasticity of substitution σ > 1 between the varieties, U =
[∫ I
0 q
σ−1
σ
i di
] σ
σ−1
.24
24This implies that the varieties produced by the roofing firms are no perfect substitutes. Note, however, that the
results of the paper also hold if varieties are perfect substitutes (i.e. σ → ∞).
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Total roofing sales are R =
∫ I
0 piqidi. Utility maximization implies a downward sloping demand
curve for each variety,
qi =
( pi
P
)−σ R
P
(9)
with the CES price index P =
[∫ I
0 p
1−σ
i
]1/(1−σ)
. We assume that demand for the overall output
of the industry is price sensitive with the constant price elasticity of demand ε < 1, Q = Q0P−ε ,
where Q = R/P are real sales.
A.1.3 Labour Demand
Due to monopolistic competition, prices are a markup on marginal costs, where w̄ are wages:
pi =
w̄
ϕ
σ
σ −1
(10)
Free entry implies that new firms enter the market until profits decline to zero, from which we
derive firm size:25
qi = (σ −1)ϕ f (11)
Firm size is exogenous. Without loss of generalizability, we normalize ϕ ≡ σ/(σ − 1) and
f ≡ 1/σ .26 Using equilibrium firm size (11) and the price markup (10) in the product demand
equation (9) then provides
w̄σ = RPσ−1 (12)
This equation tells us that the wage, at which firms break even, increases in the size of the market
R – the larger the market, the higher the wage that firms can afford. Moreover, firms charge the
same prices, so that the price index simplifies to P = w̄Q1/(1−σ), where Q is total roofing output.
Lower-case letters refer to firm-level variables, upper-case letters refer to industry-level variables.
We rearrange equation (12) to receive the industry-level product demand equation:
Q = w̄−ε̃Qε̃/ε0 (13)
25We assume free entry to keep the analysis as simple as possible. Introducing Melitz (2003)-type entrance costs
and firm heterogeneity doesn’t change the main results.
26See Baldwin et al. (2003, p. 23) for the innocuousness of these normalizations. These normalizations do not
affect our key results.
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where ε̃ ≡ ε 1−σ
ε−σ is the wage elasticity of total roofing product demand, which depends on the
price elasticity of roofing demand ε and the elasticity of substitution between firms’ varieties σ .
Demand for high-skilled workers H is proportional, as there is no firm heterogeneity:
H =
1
σ
w̄−ε̃Qε̃/ε0 (14)
We derive demand for medium-skilled workers by combining (7) with (13) and the production
function.
M =
σ −1
σ
Qε̃/ε0 w
−η
M w̄
η−ε̃ (15)
The demand for medium-skilled workers is thus a decreasing function of wages for medium-
skilled workers wM and a de- or increasing function of average wages w̄ depending on the relative
sizes of the elasticity of demand ε̃ and the substitution elasticity between low and medium-skilled
workers η .
A.1.4 Labour Supply
At each time instant t, there is a huge mass of low-skilled workers LSt who are searching for
work. Their mass exceeds aggregate demand for low-skilled workers LSt ≥ Lt ,27 so that they only
earn their reservation wage, unless there is a minimum wage that exceeds their reservation wage
wL = max(w,wMW ). At each time instant, δLt low-skilled workers retire and are replaced by
other low-skilled entrants, ELt = δLt .
Assume that at each time instant t there is a mass of medium EM and high-skilled entrants
EH , who supply one unit of labour with an extensive labour supply wage elasticity of θ . At
each time instant, all workers face the exogenous retirement risk δ . Labour supply for medium-
and high-skilled workers thus is Mt = (1−δ )Mt−1 +EMwθM,e and Ht = (1−δ )Ht−1 +EHwθH,e.
wM,e and wH,e denote expected medium- and high-skilled workers’ wages.
In the steady state, the inflow (entrants) of workers equals the outflow (retirement), and
expected wages correspond to actual wages. Steady-state labour supply of medium- and high-
skilled workers thus is M = EM
δ
wθM and H =
EH
δ
wθH . We abstract from any wage setting frictions,
27This assumption is motivated by the high unemployment rate among low-skilled workers.
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which implies no unemployment among medium- and high-skilled workers. We solve the steady
state labour market equilibrium by plugging labour demand (15) into steady state labour supply
and drop all time indices. In the steady state, medium-skilled workers’ wages are
wM =
(
δ (σ −1)
σEM
)1/(θ+η)
Q
ε̃/ε
θ+η
0 w̄
η−ε̃
θ+η (16)
We proceed analogously for high-skilled workers to get
wH =
(
δ
σEH
)1/θ
Q
ε̃/ε
θ
0 w̄
−ε̃/θ (17)
A.2 Minimum Wage Bite
This appendix builds on Aretz et al. (2011) to analyze the bite of the minimum wage in more detail.
Figure 1 indicates a strong bite of the minimum wage, as reflected by the significant compression
at the lower tail of the East German wage distribution. Table 4 provides direct evidence on the
size of the minimum wage bite using several indicators for East and West Germany, separately.
The data refers to the June 30th prior of each new minimum wage regulation. The starting date
of each new minimum wage regulation is depicted jointly with the subsequent new minimum
wage level in Columns (1) and (2).28 Columns (3)-(5) show statistics for workers with an hourly
wage below the next minimum wage including its share among the workforce (Column 3), the
average individual wage gap, defined as the difference between individuals hourly wage and the
expected hourly wage if firms fully comply with the new regulations (Column 4), as well as the
average annual hourly wage growth (Column 5). If actual wage growth of workers below the
next minimum wage is smaller than the wage gap, firms do not fully comply with the minimum
wage regulations. Column (6) shows the annual wage growth for workers with a hourly wage
at or above the next minimum wage. Column (7) shows the Kaitz-Index, defined as the ratio
between the minimum wage level and the median wage in the industry.
28Note that the indicators may slightly underestimate the bite due to the fact that hourly wages may contain
overtime compensation that is not subject to the minimum wage. Overtime hours account for 6% of the working
hours in June. This may lead to an estimated hourly wage that is up to 1.6% too high depending on the applied
overtime compensation scheme ranging from no additional compensation to a markup of 25%. Since we do not
know which scheme is applied and since the resulting imprecision appears to be rather marginal, we left the data
uncorrected.
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Table 4: Indicators of the Minimum Wage Bite Measured in June Prior to the Next Minimum
Wage Regulations
Workers with an hourly wage:
below next at/above next
minimum wage minimum wage
Date of next minimum minimum Share of all Wage gapa Annual Wage Annual Wage Kaitz
wage regulation wage (in e) workers (in %) (in %) growthb(in %) growthb(in %) Indexc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
West Germany
01.10.97 8.2 3.8 16.9 3.6 2.3 65
01.09.01 8.9 1.5 9.6 7.0 1.5 67
01.03.03 9.0 1.5 10.0 5.6 2.5 67
01.04.04 9.3 2.1 9.3 5.9 1.5 68
01.05.05 9.6 2.7 8.6 4.6 0.7 70
01.01.06 10.0 4.1 7.8 5.0 1.2 73
01.01.07 10.0 4.4 8.2 7.0 3.3 73
01.01.08 10.2 5.2 6.9 5.6 2.3 73
01.01.09 10.4 4.6 6.5 8.1 3.1 73
East Germany
01.10.97 7.7 13.4 12.2 6.7 -0.0 82
01.09.01 8.4 14.0 4.1 4.7 0.7 89
01.03.03 9.0 33.9 4.3 4.2 0.2 95
01.04.04 9.3 43.8 3.9 4.2 0.4 98
01.05.05 9.6 46.7 4.3 4.0 0.2 99
01.01.06 10.0 55.3 4.1 4.1 0.2 100
01.01.07 10.0 45.0 1.6 1.9 1.0 100
01.01.08 10.2 53.2 2.7 3.3 1.4 101
01.01.09 10.4 49.8 2.4 3.3 0.7 100
a The individual wage gap is calculated as follows wgapit = (wMW i,t+1−wit)/wit .
b Wage growth corresponds to the actual observed percentage nominal wage change (wit+1−wit)/wit between the
June preceding and the June following the new minimum wage regulation.
c The Kaitz-Index is defined as the minimum wage divided by the median wage.
Own cacluations based on the LAK data.
The indicators show large differences between East and West Germany. For West Germany,
the share of workers with a binding minimum wage (Column 3) increased moderately from 3.8%
to 5.2% between 1997 and 2007, before dropping again slightly in the year thereafter. According
to the Kaitz-Index, the bite in West Germany is high and lies in the upper range of what has
been found for other countries. The figures for the wage gap and actual wage growth among
West German workers (Columns 4 and 5) reveal that actual wage growth lags behind what is
necessary to fully comply with the minimum wage regulations. However, this deviation declines
towards the end of the observation period. The latter might be explained by stronger controls
after 2006, as reported by industry insiders (Aretz et al., 2011). Despite the lack of compliance,
the figures for wage growth range between 3.6% and 8.1% for affected workers. The salaries of
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non-affected workers increased only moderately by 0.7-3.3%, which suggests a decline in wage
inequality.
For East Germany, we observe a much stronger bite of the minimum wage. According to
Column (3), 13.4% of all East German roofers earned a wage below the 1997 wage floor in
June 1997. The share increased rapidly after 2002, when the minimum wage was raised to
the same level in East and West, which implied a rapid rise in the East. In June 2005, more
than half of the workers (55.3%) had a wage below the 2006 minimum wage level. In fact, the
Kaitz-Index approached the value of 100 in 2005, that is, the median wage equals the minimum
wage. Compared to the findings for a strongly affected low-wage industry in the UK (Machin
et al., 2003), the bite in the German roofing industry seems extraordinarily large. Machin et al.
(2003) find that 32 percent of the workers were paid below the (age-specific) minimum wage
before it was introduced. The mere size of affected workers in East Germany might also explain
the higher compliance (i.e. lower deviation of wage gap and actual wage growth, Columns (4)
and (5)) compared to West Germany. The more workers earn a minimum wage in a firm, the
harder it is to circumvent the regulations. More strikingly, Column (4) shows that East German
workers with salaries above the wage floor experienced almost no nominal wage growth or even
suffered from wage losses. In the recovery period towards the end of our time series, wages
increased only moderately in nominal terms.
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Figure 6: Kaitz Index in OECD Countries
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Notes: The figure shows the Kaitz Index (= minimum wage / median wage)
for 31 OECD countries for the years 2000, 2010 and 2018. The mean of the
Kaitz index is 0.44 (2000), 0.51 (2010) and 0.54 (2018). Own illustration
using data from OECD.stat
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A.3 LAK data
The LAK is a public service institution of the employer association ZVDH and the trade union
IG Bau in Germany. The main objective is to help insure employees against several structural
disadvantages of the industry. For instance, the agency compensates roofers for earnings
losses caused by bad weather, ensures a thirteenth monthly income, administrates working-time
accounts and old age benefits and promotes vocational education in the industry. For these
purposes, the office collects monthly information from firms on the number of actual working
hours for each worker as well as their gross wages and the length of their current employment
from the year 1995 onwards. Since the reporting is mandatory for firms, and may impose a
penalty for non-compliance, the information is highly likely to comprise all blue-collar roofers.
The information is complemented with further worker characteristics including the date of
birth and sex of workers as well as an establishment identifier to calculate further firm-level
characteristics. Since the data does not comprise information on education and training, we drop
workers below 19 years of age that should eliminate most apprentices that are not covered by the
minimum wage regulations. Furthermore, we focus on men only, since female workers account
for only a small fraction in this industry (less than 2%). Moreover, we drop observations where
workers are reported to be sick, on vacation, serving in the military, and those with missing and
unrealistically high (or low) wages and drop minor employment.29. Finally, we focus on monthly
observations in June to make the data comparable to the BA data and to avoid distortions due to
seasonal fluctuations during the months October to April where compensation payments by the
LAK are more relevant. In total, we are able to exploit 1,055,137 June observations for 206,753
roofers across the period 1995-2010.
29In particular, we drop observations where the hourly wages falls below (above) 50% (150%) of the median
hourly wage.
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A.4 Business cycle trends
Figure 7: Business Cycle Trends for Roofers and Selected Control Industries
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(b) Gross daily wages
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(c) Employment
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Notes: Revenues are taken from the German sales-tax statistics provided by the Federal Statistical Office. Gross
daily wages and employment figures are based on the BA data (see Section 4.1).
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A.5 Changes in the Earnings Distribution
Table 5: Average Worker Characteristics by Quantiles of the Real Daily Wage Distribution,
German Roofing Industry (BA-data)
Quantile
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9
West Germany
real daily wage (in e) 51.6 60.5 69.7 79 90.1
yearly growth of real daily wages (in %) 3 1.2 .1 -.6 -1.1
nominal daily wage (in e) 57.1 67 77.2 87.5 99.8
yearly growth of nominal daily wages (in %) 4.6 2.8 1.7 1 .5
share of unskilled workers (non-technicians) 23.9 15.9 9.4 6 5.8
share of skilled workers (technicians) 74.5 82.7 88 88.8 81.8
share of master craftmen .8 1.2 2.3 4.9 12
without vocational traning degree 11.1 7.4 3.6 2.8 3.2
with vocational traning degree 76.7 83.1 88.4 89.9 88.9
with university degree .2 .2 .2 .3 .5
tenure in industry (in days) 1364.1 1705.5 2090.4 2205.4 2236.3
average age 30.2 33.1 37.7 40.5 42.5
number of workers 432 432 432 432 432
East Germany
real daily wage (in e) 37.9 42.2 47.3 54.5 65.1
yearly growth of real daily wages (in %) 1.9 .4 -.5 -1.1 -1.7
nominal daily wage (in e) 42 46.7 52.3 60.2 71.9
yearly growth of nominal daily wages (in %) 3.5 2 1 .4 -.1
share of unskilled workers (non-technicians) 12.5 9.3 9.3 9.4 9.5
share of skilled workers (technicians) 86.5 90.1 89.2 86.6 83.2
share of master craftmen .7 .6 1.3 3.9 7.3
without vocational traning degree 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.4 2.4
with vocational traning degree 85.1 86.9 87.9 83.7 81.3
with university degree .3 .1 .2 .5 .7
tenure in industry (in days) 1327.6 1673.4 1853.7 1979.3 1963.3
average age 34.6 37 38.5 40 40.8
number of workers 175 175 176 175 175
Notes: All figures shown in the table reflect average yearly values. Real wages are inflation-adjusted
to prices in 1994.
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A.6 Wages and Hours Worked
Figure 8: Development of Real Hourly Wages, Real Monthly Wages and Hours Worked in the
German Roofing Industry (LAK data)
(a) Real hourly wages
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(b) Monthly hours worked
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(c) Real monthly wages
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Notes: The vertical lines represent mark the introductions of the minimum wage in October 1997 and the national
minimum wage in March 2003.
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A.7 Substitution and Scale Effects
Table 6: Wage Effect by Skill Group as shown in Figure 4
West Germany East Germany
Skills: Low Medium High Low Medium High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat × post 0.01** -0.00* -0.00** 0.06*** 0.00 -0.01***
(2.54) (-1.69) (-2.04) (14.07) (1.18) (-4.11)
Post 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.01***
(57.59) (77.18) (63.44) (16.36) (12.97) (4.67)
N 9664 9660 9569 2607 2606 2578
R-squared 0.442 0.541 0.446 0.414 0.125 0.009
F 3566.5 5318.0 3596.6 860.1 173.9 11.5
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
All estimates include industry-region fixed effects. Regressions are weighted with
pre-treatment region-skill-specific employment.
Table 7: Wage Effect by Skill Group as shown in Figure 4 (unweighted)
West Germany East Germany
Skills: Low Medium High Low Medium High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat × post 0.00* -0.00 -0.01*** 0.06*** -0.00 -0.04***
(1.74) (-1.21) (-4.11) (12.45) (-0.21) (-8.30)
Post 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.04***
(50.99) (69.58) (56.77) (15.81) (13.98) (13.19)
N 9685 9669 9569 2607 2606 2578
R-squared 0.376 0.510 0.393 0.360 0.136 0.068
F 2715.8 4691.6 2890.5 683.0 191.4 88.0
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. All
estimates include industry-region fixed effects.
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Table 8: Substitution and Scale Effect by Skill Group as shown in Figure 5
Sub effect Scale effect Net effect
Skills: Low Medium High All Low Medium High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
West Germany
Treat × post -0.16*** 0.06*** 0.05*** -0.09*** -0.24*** -0.02* -0.02
(-14.31) (6.09) (2.59) (-10.25) (-20.05) (-1.82) (-1.10)
Post 0.29*** -0.02*** -0.26*** -0.14*** 0.12*** -0.18*** -0.41***
(38.73) (-3.43) (-20.27) (-23.48) (14.42) (-22.71) (-36.42)
N 9700 9700 9700 9700 9685 9685 9700
R-squared 0.165 0.004 0.068 0.172 0.043 0.105 0.222
F 894.8 19.1 328.1 937.5 201.0 528.7 1291.0
East Germany
Treat × post -0.35*** 0.27*** 0.01 -0.07** -0.34*** 0.26*** -0.12***
(-14.61) (13.75) (0.16) (-2.57) (-8.40) (9.70) (-2.98)
Post 0.10*** 0.07*** -0.13*** -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.54*** -0.69***
(6.00) (4.97) (-5.94) (-28.35) (-19.42) (-29.55) (-24.57)
N 2609 2609 2609 2609 2609 2609 2595
R-squared 0.094 0.205 0.027 0.431 0.377 0.304 0.381
F 126.0 313.5 34.3 921.9 736.2 531.6 743.2
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. All estimates include
industry-region fixed effects. Substitution und Scale effects are weighted with pre-treatment regional
employment. Net effects are weighted with pre-treatment region-skill-specific employment.
Table 9: Substitution and Scale Effect by Skill Group as shown in Figure 5 (unweighted)
Sub effect Scale effect Net effect
Skills: Low Medium High All Low Medium High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
West Germany
Treat × post -0.15*** 0.10*** -0.05 -0.10*** -0.24*** 0.00 -0.12***
(-6.49) (3.88) (-1.16) (-10.05) (-11.61) (0.07) (-3.33)
Post 0.29*** -0.10*** -0.34*** -0.10*** 0.18*** -0.20*** -0.42***
(17.50) (-5.73) (-11.15) (-13.78) (12.04) (-12.86) (-16.13)
N 9713 9713 9713 9713 9713 9713 9713
R-squared 0.040 0.004 0.031 0.096 0.018 0.035 0.071
F 187.3 16.4 143.2 483.6 82.1 163.2 345.1
East Germany
Treat × post -0.29*** 0.30*** 0.05 -0.11*** -0.39*** 0.20*** -0.08
(-8.26) (8.80) (0.80) (-3.39) (-8.07) (5.22) (-1.28)
Post -0.04 0.03 -0.19*** -0.51*** -0.55*** -0.48*** -0.66***
(-1.63) (1.25) (-4.42) (-22.71) (-16.18) (-17.73) (-14.59)
N 2609 2609 2609 2609 2609 2609 2609
R-squared 0.069 0.072 0.012 0.343 0.296 0.148 0.165
F 90.0 94.5 15.2 636.0 511.7 210.6 240.8
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. All estimates include
industry-region fixed effects.
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Table 10: Minimum Wage Effects on Industry- and Firm Revenues
West Germany East Germany
total industry average firm firm revenues total industry average firm firm revenues
revenues revenues per worker revenues revenues per worker
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat × post -0.65*** -0.37*** -0.58*** -0.29*** -0.35*** -0.51***
(-9.98) (-8.05) (-9.17) (-4.78) (-5.74) (-5.37)
Post 1.99*** 0.30*** 0.67*** -0.01 -0.00 0.96***
(65.55) (13.72) (22.90) (-0.31) (-0.16) (21.62)
Constant 16.94*** 14.57*** 13.18*** 19.27*** 14.65*** 12.76***
(734.26) (888.92) (593.13) (897.01) (680.86) (381.19)
N 8876 8876 8876 2609 2609 2609
R-squared 0.369 0.023 0.060 0.013 0.018 0.170
F 2419.6 95.9 263.6 15.6 21.7 248.5
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. All estimates include
industry-region fixed effects and are weighted with pre-treatment total regional revenues.
A.8 Minimum Wage Effects on Firm Revenues
To provide further support on negative aggregate demand shocks in response to the minimum
wage in East and West Germany (negative scale effects in Section 6), Table 10 shows the results
using firm revenues on the left hand side of Equation 6. Revenues are taken from the Mannheimer
Unternehmenspanel (MUP), a data base that collects information on all active firms in Germany.
We look at log total industry revenues, average firm revenues as well as average firm revenues
per worker, all defined at the regional level. The regressions are weighted with pre-treatment
regional revenues to control for size differences between regions. Table 11 provides unweighted
results.
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Table 11: Minimum Wage Effects on Industry and Firm Revenues (unweighted)
West Germany East Germany
total industry average firm firm revenues total industry average firm firm revenues
revenues revenues per worker revenues revenues per worker
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat × post -0.50*** -0.19*** -0.44*** -0.16** -0.24*** -0.40***
(-8.66) (-4.30) (-7.37) (-2.41) (-3.68) (-4.09)
Post 2.22*** 0.50*** 0.86*** -0.04 0.03 1.01***
(58.61) (17.39) (21.80) (-0.81) (0.56) (14.71)
Constant 15.70*** 14.19*** 12.67*** 18.11*** 14.54*** 12.46***
(626.53) (742.70) (486.90) (653.20) (531.96) (299.47)
N 9225 9225 9225 2609 2609 2609
R-squared 0.368 0.044 0.061 0.008 0.009 0.108
F 2493.4 195.3 279.5 9.3 11.0 147.8
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. All estimates include
industry-region fixed effects.
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A.9 Skill Supply
Table 12: Minimum Wage Effects on Industry Skill Supply (unweighted)
West Germany East Germany
(A) (B) (A) (B)
Share of Skills of Share of Skills of
apprentices apprentices apprentices apprentices
among entrants among entrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat × post 0.07*** -0.02*** 0.03** -0.01
(10.31) (-4.23) (2.57) (-0.56)
Post 0.00 0.02*** -0.01 0.04***
(0.42) (5.58) (-0.95) (4.53)
Constant 0.26*** 0.03*** 0.19*** 0.02***
(88.38) (15.07) (42.90) (3.81)
N 9640 8937 2598 2396
R-squared 0.024 0.004 0.003 0.015
F 111.6 15.7 4.1 17.1
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
All estimates include industry-year fixed effects.
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